管理激励会抑制企业的保险购买意愿吗?——基于制造型上市企业保险购买决策的实证研究

Will Management Incentives Inhibit Companies′ Willingness to Buy Insurance? An Empirical Study of Insurance Purchase Decision of Manufacturing Listed Enterprises

基于2010-2017年间A股制造业上市公司的管理激励和保险购买数据,本文运用Logit模型实证检验股权激励、货币薪酬和在职消费三项管理激励措施在企业保险购买决策中的财富效应和损失规避效应。研究发现,股权激励在非国有企业的保险购买决策中体现了财富效应,抑制了企业的保险购买意愿,但对国有企业的保险购买决策无显著影响。在职消费在国有企业的保险购买决策中体现了财富效应,但对非国有企业无显著影响。货币薪酬对各类型企业的保险购买决策均无显著影响。因此,在新一轮国企收入分配改革中,企业在进行激励方案设计时,应根据企业性质和激励方式,激励与约束相结合,防止企业承担过高风险。

Based on the data of management incentives and insurance purchase of A-share manufacturing listed companies from 2010 to 2017,this paper uses Logit model to empirically test the wealth effect and loss aversion effect of three management incentives,namely equity incentives,monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption.The study finds that equity incentive embodies wealth effect in the insurance purchase decision of non-state-owned enterprises,inhibits the insurance purchase intention of enterprises,but has no significant impact on the insurance purchase decision of state-owned enterprises.In-service consumption reflects wealth effect in insurance purchase decision-making of state-owned enterprises,but has no significant impact on non-state-owned enterprises.Monetary remuneration has no significant impact on insurance purchase decisions of different types of enterprises.Therefore,in the new round of income distribution reform of state-owned enterprises,when designing incentive schemes,enterprises should combine incentive and restraint according to the nature of enterprises and incentive methods,so as to prevent enterprises from taking too high risks.