基于演化博弈的长江三峡流域生态补偿机制研究

Study on Ecological Compensation of Three Gorges Basin Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

在长江经济带绿色发展背景下,基于演化博弈理论,构建三峡流域上下游政府及中央生态补偿行为博弈模型,对3者之间的利益诉求与补偿行为进行分析,以存在复杂利益博弈关系的长江三峡流域生态补偿案例开展分析。研究表明:无中央政府约束下,三峡流域上下游政府难以协同合作进行生态补偿;引入中央奖惩机制对双方政府的环境收益进行控制,可以提高长江三峡流域生态补偿治理效率。通过Vensim软件进一步验证,对中央政府在不同状态下的最佳决策开展仿真实验,为三峡流域决策提供参考。

Under the background of the green development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt, based on the evolutionary game theory, the game model of the upstream and downstream governments of the Three Gorges Basin and the central ecological compensation behavior are constructed to analyze the interests appeal and compensation behaviors among the three parties, so as to have a complex interest game relationship in the Yangtze River and analyze the cases of ecological compensation in the Three Gorges Basin. The research shows that without the restriction of central government, it is difficult for the upstream and downstream governments in the Three Gorges Basin to cooperate with each other to carry out ecological compensation. The introduction of the central reward and punishment mechanism to control the environmental benefits of the governments can improve the efficiency of ecological compensation and management in the Three Gorges Basin. The Vensim software is used to further verify the optimal decision-making of the central government under different conditions, which can provide reference for the decision-making of the Three Gorges Basin.