理解央地财政博弈的新视角——来自地方债发还方式改革的证据

A New Perspective for Understanding the Central-Local Fiscal Game——Evidence from Reforms in the Issuance and Repayment Modes of Municipal Bonds

中国特色社会主义进入新时代,推进高质量发展势在必行,在这一新的历史时点,仅从地方政府视角探讨中国未来发展路径已出现较大不适应性。从中央政府角度出发,通过挖掘央地财政博弈过程以观察中央财政改革目标如何通过其顶层设计而逐步实现,并以地方债发还方式改革作为典型案例,使用倍差法对中央政府顶层设计的过程及其效果展开实证检验。研究发现,中央政府在顶层设计的基础上,根据对地方政府行为的观察和判断,适时调整赋权方式,最终推动了改革目标的实现。这为理解改革开放后的央地财政博弈,提供了一个新视角。

As socialism with Chinese characteristics enters a new era,it is imperative to promote high-quality development.At this new historical turn,it is no longer appropriate to explore the path of China’s future development in terms of local governments only.We have therefore conducted an empirical test of the process and effect of the central government’s top-level design through the difference-indifference method.Our test explores the process of central-local fiscal gaming from the point of view of the central government,observing how central fiscal reform achieves its goal through top-level design.Reform of the issuance and repayment modes of municipal bonds is taken as a typical case.Our findings show that on the basis of top-level design and our observation and conclusions about local government behavior,the central government has made timely adjustments to its empowerment mode and ultimately facilitated realization of the goals of reform.This provides a new perspective for understanding the central-local fiscal game post-reform and opening up.