《逻辑哲学论》的“思想”

The Notion of Thought in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

“思想”是《逻辑哲学论》中一个很重要但又很不清晰的概念;维特根斯坦本人,以及常见的哲学文献,都没有为此概念提供清晰可把握的解说。如何准确理解这一概念,仍然是诠释《逻辑哲学论》需要克服的困难。首先,论文从《逻辑哲学论》提供的直接文本依据出发,立足于“思想的本质是逻辑”这个较通行的解读,对青年维特根斯坦关于“思想”的主要论题作学理上的梳理;其次,以维特根斯坦致罗素的信件为线索,论文尝试收集一些间接证据,讨论将“思想”解读为心理对象的可能性,并阐明这一解读会产生的一些困难;再次,基于一些认识论上的理由,论文建议:对“思想”概念作逻辑主义解读更契合《逻辑哲学论》的文本和早期维特根斯坦的心理–历史实际。

In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,the notion of thought plays an important role in Wittgenstein’s account of Language,world,and the relationship between them;however,Wittgenstein failed to provide a clear explanation of this term.In order to deepening our understanding concerning Wittgenstein’s early philosophy,this essay focus on some basic issues of this notion.By exposition of some texts of the Tractatus and explaining two possible readings of this notion,i.e.,logicist reading and psychologist reading,I claim that these two readings are incompatible at some aspects;furthermore,since the psychologist reading suggests that it would conflict with some core claims of the Tractatus,hence,the better reading of Wittgenstein’s notion of thought is the logicist one which highlights the logical essence of thought.