基于博弈模型构建寻找采矿用地退出新途径

Constructing a new way of mining land withdrawal based on game model

我国面临着采矿用地退出进度缓慢且退出效果不佳的问题。据统计,采矿废弃地占工业废弃地的70%以上,采矿用地的顺利退出对于减缓建设用地指标压力、调节耕地占补平衡矛盾、促进土地资源集约节约利用具有重要意义。由于采矿活动结束后,土地使用权面临收回的情况,政府与企业就采矿用地退出后的利益分配进行谈判、博弈,这成为阻碍采矿用地顺利退出的主要矛盾。为此,本研究通过运用鲁宾斯坦恩-斯塔尔“讨价还价”理论来建立政府-企业博弈模型,模拟分析政府与企业之间在采矿用地退出时的利益分配过程,运用逆向归纳的思路求解出双方所得利益。研究发现,影响采矿用地退出进度的关键因素为双方在博弈过程中各自的贴现率,基于此提出了PPP模式、多样化供地以及复垦激励机制等采矿用地退出新途径。本研究可为指导采矿用地退出和实现资源优化配置提供理论参考。

China is facing the problem that the withdrawal of mining land is slow and the effect is not good.By using Rubenstein Starr's“bargaining”theory to establish government-enterprise game model,this paper simulates and analyzes the benefit distribution process between government and enterprise when the mining land is withdrawn.It is found that the key factor influencing the withdrawal progress of mining land is the discount rate of both sides in the process of game.Based on this,a new approach of mining land withdrawal is proposed,such as PPP model,diversification of land supply and incentive mechanism of reclamation.This study can provide a theoretical reference for guiding the withdrawal of mining land and realizing the optimal allocation of resources.