暗送秋波：管理层引导与分析师盈余预测误差

Cast Sheep’s Eyes: Managements’ Guidance and Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors

基于2006年至2012年会计师事务所向行业监督部门报备的上市公司审计前后利润调整独特数据,本文检验了分析师盈余预测误差和管理层期望盈余差异的相关性,发现二者显著相关,分析师预测对管理层内幕信息的利用程度约为12.3%-19.9%,说明二者相关性不是"机缘巧合",而是管理层向分析师"暗送秋波"的结果。公司机构投资者持股比例越高、明星分析师跟踪人数越多时,相关性减弱;公司由规模越大的会计师事务所审计,二者正相关性越强。本研究检验了分析师盈余预测中可能包含的公司未审计盈余信息,部分打开了分析师预测过程这一"黑箱";梳理了审计活动对分析师盈余预测误差度最直接的影响路径,丰富了审计理论;证实了管理层向分析师传递内部信息,为监管机构制定与完善分析师、管理层、会计师事务所的行为规范提供了经验证据。

According to the cases in capital market, we could find that sell-side analysts(hereinafter referred to as analysts) obtain firms’ inside information via establishing the private relationship with managers. But there is still an open question calling for answers: to what extent those analysts take advantage of the private information in their earnings forecasts? From 2006-2012, auditing firms in China were required to provide their regulator, the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants(CICPA) with information on the pre-audit and audited earnings of all publicly listed firms. We utilize this unique dataset to explore the relationship between analysts’ forecast errors(forecast earnings minus reported earnings) and managers’ expected earnings gap(difference between pre-audit and audited earnings). The empirical results turn out that analysts’ forecast errors and managers’ expected earnings gap are positively and significantly associated with each other. The regression results ref lect that about 12.3%-19.9% of the inside information were included in analysts’ earnings forecasts, which indicates that the association is not by coincidence but by managers’ intentional leakage. Moreover, we find that analysts who follow firms with higher institutional ownership and who are star analysts have relatively high independence, while Big 10 audit firms will intensify the positive association between forecast error and audit adjustment. This paper examines that some analysts may include the information of pre-audited earnings of listed companies in their earnings forecasts, which is helpful to opening the "black box" of the process when analysts make forecasts in some degree. We possibly contribute to the audit theory by clarifying the more direct inf luence of audit activities on analysts’ forecast errors. We also verify the existence that managers transfer inside information to analysts, who provide empirical support for regulators to build or perfect the regulation on analysts, managers and audit firms(e.g. consider to disclose the information of major audit adjustments).