家族企业代际传承:经理人能力和信息甄别的视角

Succession of Family Firms:from the View of CEO’s Capacity and Information Identification

中国的家族企业面临的困难选择在于是家族继承还是市场代理。从公司治理角度看,这是代理成本与企业长期价值的比较问题,还要考虑营商环境的不确定性和企业控制权的丢失;从微观经济学的角度看,这是市场信息完善和要素定价的问题。因此,需要一个考虑不确定性的分析框架。采用实物期权定价方法,构建家族企业继承人选择的期权定价模型,用期权定价模型研究职业经理人能力和资本市场信息甄别能力与家族企业继承人选择之间的关系。用上市企业所在地的人才吸引力和行业内企业数目作为经理人人才储备的替代变量,反映经理人能力;用企业股票的个别风险反映资本市场的信息甄别能力。以1998年至2016年上市的家族企业为样本,用Logit回归模型对数据进行回归,用实证检验方法对理论模型的结论进行实证检验。研究结果表明,企业所在地人才吸引力越高,同行业经理人储备越充足,资本市场的信息甄别能力越强,家族企业聘任职业经理人继任企业总经理的概率越高,而且资本市场甄别能力与经理人储备之间存在一定的替代关系。中国家族企业继承模式在2011年以后发生了显著的变化,2011年以前绝大多数家族企业选择家族内部成员继任企业总经理,2011年以后过半数的企业开始考虑聘任职业经理人。在家族企业继承过程中存在性别差异,二代为男性时上述结论仍然成立,二代为女性时上述结论并不成立,统计数据表明二代性别为女性时家族企业更偏好聘任职业经理人。研究突破了传统的代理理论框架,通过期权定价模型将经理人能力和资本市场信息甄别能力代入继承人选择模型中,开拓了新的研究视角。不仅为民营企业的继承人选择、也为混合所有制改革背景下国有企业经理人的市场化提供制度设计和改善的理论依据;提供了经理人能力水平和资本市场信息甄别能力与家族企业继承人选择之间的经验证据,为家族企业向现代企业制度转型和促进中国职业经理人市场的跨地域均衡发展以及提高资本市场信息甄别能力提供政策参考。

Forty years after the opening and reform of China,family firms in China will face the coming peak of intergenerational inheritance. Family succession or market agency is a dilemma. In the view of corporate governance,it depends on agency cost as well as long-term value of the company. The uncertainty of the business environment and the possibility of the loss of corporate control right must be considered as well. While from the perspective of microeconomics,this problem also depends on the perfection of market information and factor pricing.Therefore,an analytical framework considering uncertainty is needed. An option pricing model is constructed to reflect the relationship between the family firms’ successor choice and the influence factors,such as CEO’s capacity and information identification. The location of listed companies is used to reflect the talent attractiveness,and the number of companies in the industry is used to reflect the talent reservation. These two indexes are used to reflect the capability of CEOs. However the information identification ability is measured by the idiosyncratic risk of a firm. Data of listed family firms from 1998 to 2016 is used to test the results deduced by the model.The empirical results show that as the location of family firms are more attractive for managers and the competition in the industry is fiercer,the capital market’s information identification capacity is stronger,and the probability of family firms to employ professional manager is higher. Further results show that there is a substitution relationship between information identification capacity and the CEOs’ reservation. However,our data show that the succession choice of family firms in China has changed since2011. Before 2011,most firms were inherited by their family members. Yet after 2011,professional managers were considered to be candidates. During the succession process,there is gender gap. If the second generation is male,the results remain constant while if the second generation is female,professional managers are preferred.The managerial labor market is an indispensable element for the business environment theoretically and it can provide the market price of agency costs. The following results and enlightenments are gained: key elements which are helpful to establish the modern enterprise system are developing the managerial labor market,promoting the reasonable movement of professional managers,enhancing the capability of professional managers,improving the environment and the information identity capacity of capital market. These elements are also helpful to promote the evolution of enterprises’ control right,as well as the healthy and sustained development of private enterprises.