摘要
以合同能源管理广泛的节能效益分享型合同模式为研究对象,分析其在我国的适用性,明确效益分享型合同能源管理项目的收益分配主体为用能企业和节能服务公司,并分析确定在双方的合同谈判过程中需要进行的有关节能效益分配的决策变量,包括节能收益分享比例﹑合同期长度和初始投资等.基于Stackelberg双寡头博弈理论,分别构建节能服务公司主导时和用能企业主导时的收益分配模型.以数值算例为背景,运用MATLAB对两种模型进行优化求解,分析不同主导权对双方利益分配决策的影响,并据此提出相关建议,以促进节能效益分享型合同能源管理项目收益的合理分配.
This paper takes Shared-Savings contract mode which is common in Energy Performance Contracting(EPC)as research object,to analyze its applicability in China.It also makes clear that the main benefit takers of the Shared-Savings contract are energy-using enterprises and Energy Service Company(ESCo).The decision variables of energy-saving benefit allocation in contract negotiation process are also discussed and given in this paper,which includes the proportion of benefit for each part,the contract life span and the initial investment,etc Based on Stackelberg’s duopoly game theory,the benefit-sharing models of energy-using enterprise and ESCo under different dominant right were built.Taking numerical example as background and using MATLAB as main tool,two models were respectively calculated and optimized After this,the difference of two results were detailed analyzed Based on these,some useful suggestion for reasonable benefit distribution in Energy-Savings EPC project was given in the final part.
作者
李怡飞
刘伊生
LI Yi-fei;LIU Yi-sheng(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing100044,China)
出处
《建筑节能》
CAS
2019年第10期162-167,共6页
BUILDING ENERGY EFFICIENCY
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71871014)
关键词
合同能源管理
收益分配
节能服务公司
STACKELBERG模型
energy performance contracting(EPC)
gains allocation
energy service company(ESCo)
Stackelberg leadership model