高管股权激励、分析师跟踪与资本结构动态调整

Managerial Equity Incentive,Analysts’ Coverage and Capital Structure Dynamic Adjustment

以2010-2017年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,运用多元回归分析方法,实证检验了高管股权激励、分析师跟踪与资本结构动态调整之间的关系。研究发现,高管股权激励、分析师跟踪有效促进了企业资本结构调整,且当企业资本结构向下调整时,两者对资本结构调整的促进作用更显著。进一步分析表明,分析师跟踪能够正向调节高管股权激励与资本结构动态调整的关系。本文将企业内部激励与外部监督相结合,以期深化资本结构动态调整的研究,并为后续研究提供一个全新视角,为企业制定有效的高管激励与监督方案提供理论依据。

Based on panel data of Chinese listed companies in A-shared market from 2010 to 2017,the relationships among managerial equity incentive,analysts’ coverage and capital structure dynamic adjustment are empirically tested by using multiple regression analysis. It is found that managerial equity incentive and analysts’ coverage have effectively promoted the adjustment of corporate capital structure;when the direction of adjustment is downward,the effect is much more significant;furthermore,the results show that the more the coverage of analysts,the greater the impact of equity incentive on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure. The combination of internal incentive and external supervision towards enterprises deepens the research on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure,which provides a new perspective for further research,and establishes theoretical foundation for formulating incentive and supervisory schemes to executives.