基于双重身份拍卖的报价行为研究

Dual Identity Auction:Theory and Monte Carlo Simulation

在传统拍卖理论下研究信息不对称情况,一方如何通过机制设计获取另一方的信息,以获取更多的交易剩余或者达成更高的交易效率。传统拍卖中一个基本假设是一方为买方,另一方为卖方,且双方身份不会发生变化。与传统拍卖不同,双重身份拍卖中,当满足一定条件,拍卖参与人可以从对方购买商品,或者将自己持有的商品卖给对方。双重身份拍卖中,参与人获得交易剩余的可能性更大,因而,其报价行为表现的与传统拍卖存在一定差异。理论分析显示:在一方出价,另一方做出买或卖的选择情况下,如果对方对自己估值了解的信息越少,自己将获得更多的收益。在一级密封价格拍卖中,其出价比传统一级密封价格拍卖更低。蒙特卡洛模拟结果显示,在多人出价的竞价交易中,与均匀报价相比,线性报价情况下,成交价格更低,成交效率更高。

Traditional auction theory focus on how to use the mechanisms designed to obtain information of the other party in order to get more deals remaining to reach a high level of efficiency in the case of information asymmetry,and a basic assumption is that one side,as well as the other party,in the deal is the traditional auction seller,and the two sides identity will not be changed. Different with the traditional auctions,indual identity auction,when certain conditions are met,the auction participants can buy goods from each other,or to sell their goods to each other. Dual identity auction participants are more likely to secure deals remaining,thus,there are some differences in behavior with traditional auction. Theoretical analysis shows that when one side makes a bid and the other side makes a choice of buying or selling,the less information the other side knows about its own valuation,the more profit it will get.In the first-sealed price auction,its bid is lower than that of the traditional first-sealed price auction. Monte Carlo simulation results show that in multiperson bidding transactions,compared with uniform bidding,linear bidding has lower transaction price and higher transaction efficiency.