理性利他主义的可能性探究——试论从康德到内格尔的逻辑进路

An Exploration of the Possibility of Rational Altruism:On the Altruism from Kant to Nagel

康德和内格尔反对休谟等人将情感或欲望作为道德的基础,试图为道德动机寻找建立在客观理性基础之上的依据,康德以自由的形而上学观念为先验前提,认为出于自由的绝对命令是我们需要无条件遵循的普遍客观法则,也是我们道德动机得以产生的根源。而内格尔继承了康德的理性主义道路,从主观理由与客观理由两个角度,论证了主观视角下审慎理由的无时间性特征以及客观视角下个人立场向非个人立场的转换。内格尔对于建立在客观理由基础上的道德动机与道德效力的推衍性问题虽然仍存争议,但是其对于道德动机结构的可能性证明仍然为我们在伦理学上研究利他主义行为提供了一条进路。

Kant and Nagel object to Hume and others’use of emotion or desire as the basis of morality.They try to find a basis for moral motives based on objective rationality.Kant takes the metaphysical concept of freedom as a priori premise and thinks that it is free.Absolute command is the universal objective law that we need to follow unconditionally,and it is also the source of our moral motive.On the other hand,Nagel inherits Kant’s rationalism and demonstrates the timeless characteristics of prudential reasons from subjective and objective perspectives,as well as the transformation from personal standpoint to non-personal standpoint from the objective perspective.Although Nagel’s derivation of moral motives and moral effects based on objective reasons is still controversial,its proof of the possibility of moral motive structure still provides a way for us to study altruistic behavior.