具有风险传导特征的信息加工业务薪酬激励研究

Research on Salary Incentive Mechanism for Information Processing Business with Risk Conduction

企业员工通过对信息进行加工处理得到支持企业决策的信息产品,然而由于业务本身的风险传导性,前序环节的错误会随着业务流程向后传递,在为企业创造价值的同时,也为企业带来风险。基于委托代理理论,建立企业与员工之间产出相关的多代理人薪酬激励模型,得到9种情形下的薪酬激励方案及员工的最优决策。研究表明,有效的薪酬激励方法可以促使员工选择使企业净收益最大的努力水平,从而达到降低企业风险的目的,并通过算例得到部分因素对员工及企业决策的影响。

The information processing business obtains regenerative information products that support enterprises’decision-making through inspecting and processing information.Due to risk conductivity,not only value but also risks are created in the information processing business.Man-made error is one of the main reasons for risks of information processing business.To reduce the risks,an effective salary incentive mechanism is designed to improve the enthusiasm of employees.The information processing business with two links in series is considered in this paper.The output of the post-order employee is a nonlinear function of the effort level of both the pre-order employee and the post-order employee.Using process modeling technology and principal-agent theory,an incentive model for information processing business under incomplete information is established.The employees’decision-making is to choose the optimal effort level which can achieve the largest net income.The enterprise’s decision-making is to set the optimal incentive coefficient so as to maximize its own interest.The salary incentive schemes and the employees'optimal decision under the 9circumstances are obtained.Example analysis shows that when selecting and deploying employees engaged in the information processing business,enterprises should select employees with higher levels of effort,and arrange the post-order employees with high accuracy rate of inspection.