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党的巡视、超额在职消费及其渠道效应——基于中共十八大反腐建设的研究 被引量:3

The CPC’s Inspection, Excessive Perquisite Consumption and the Channel Effect: Research Based on Anti-corruption Construction of the 18th CPC National Congress
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摘要 十八大以来,党中央大力推进反腐败斗争与党风廉政建设。随着巡视制度被以党内法规的形式确立为党内监督制度,巡视工作也被赋予更多的使命与职责,目前已完成对国家机关、国有企事业单位等组织的巡视,这为我们开展巡视制度的相关研究提供了重要的现实基础。本文以被巡视国有企业的下属上市公司为检验样本,采用PSM-DID的分析方法,考察党的巡视对企业腐败行为的影响。研究发现:(1)党的巡视能够显著抑制国企高管的超额在职消费行为;(2)党的巡视对超额在职消费的抑制作用在垄断程度较高的行业更为显著;(3)渠道效应研究表明,党的巡视通过加强媒体的报道、约束地方的保护主义,从而抑制国企高管的超额在职消费行为。分位数回归及安慰剂检验结果进一步验证了结果的稳健性。本文的研究为检验反腐政策的实施效果提供了微观角度的经验证据,这为今后进一步完善党的巡视制度,加强党的建设提供了有力支撑,同时也为他国学习中国经验提供了一定借鉴。 Since the 18th CPC National Congress,the CPC Central Committee has vigorously promoted the fight against corruption and construction of clean governance.As the inspection system has been established as an intra-party supervision system in the form of the Party’s rules,the inspection work has been given more missions and responsibilities.Currently,the inspection of state organs,state-owned enterprises,institutions and other organizations has been completed,paving the way for research on this system.By taking listed companies subordinate to state-owned enterprises inspected as test samples and adopting PSM-DID as analytical method,we investigate the impact of the Party’s inspection on corporate corruption.The findings are as follows:firstly,it can effectively restrain excessive perquisite consumption behavior of senior managers in state-owned enterprises;secondly,this restraining effect is more significant in industries with higher monopoly degree;and thirdly,research on channel effect shows that it can restrain such behavior by strengthening media coverage and curbing local protectionism.Quantile regression and placebo test results further verify the above conclusions are steady.In this sense,we provide empirical evidence for examining the effect of anti-corruption policy,which is beneficial to the improvement of the Party’s inspection system and strengthening of the Party’s construction in the future.This also offers certain experience for other countries.
作者 杨野 余应敏 陈文川 YANG Ye;YU Ying-min;CHEN Wen-chuan(Institute of Finance and Economics,Central University of Finance and Ecomonics,Beijing 100081;School of Accounting,Central University of Financeand Ecomonics,Beijing 100081;School of Management,Xiamen University,Xiamen,Fujian 361005,China)
出处 《兰州大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第4期29-39,共11页 Journal of Lanzhou University(Social Sciences)
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目“审计与腐败治理:理论、路径与效果”(71702052) 广东省2017-2018年度会计科研课题(2017A09) 广州市哲学社会科学发展“十三五”规划2018年度课题(2018GZYB113)
关键词 中国共产党 反腐败斗争 巡视制度 超额在职消费 渠道效应 Communist Party of China(CPC) anti-corruption struggle inspection system excess perquisite consumption channel effect
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