相对主义的心理主义是荒谬的吗?——以胡塞尔《逻辑研究》第一卷中的论证为例

Is Relativistic Psychologism Absurd?: One Case of Husserl’s Anti-relativist Argument against Logic Psychologism in His First Book of Logical Investigations

胡塞尔在《逻辑研究》第一卷《纯粹逻辑导引》第七章中针对作为相对主义的心理主义提出了强有力的批判,他认为心理主义最为严重的问题在于它将导致某种怀疑论的相对主义,而相对主义作为一种有问题的学说是荒谬且不可接受的。在本文中,我将通过对胡塞尔论证的分析指出,胡塞尔的论证由于预先设定了对真的一个明见性理解从而在某种程度上犯了窃题的错误。同时我还将通过对相对主义的自我反驳性论证问题在当代认识论中的讨论试图表明,单单从逻辑形式上对相对主义进行反驳存在的问题和局限性,而后期的胡塞尔也显然认识到了这一点。

This paper is devoted to a critical evaluation of Husserl’s anti-relativist argument against logical psychologism which he primarily presents in his Chapter 7 of the Prolegomena to the Logical Investigations. The discussion will take place within a broader context of the central issue of the refutation of relativism about( logical) truth and the justification of objectivity of( logical) knowledge. According to Husserl,the most serious problem of psychologism is that it implies a form of skeptical relativism as an absurd doctrine. Husserl trys to refute psychologism as relativism by showing that it give rise to a paradox and contradiction,so conclude that psycholgism as one kind of sceptical relativism must be rejected. However,as I shall contend,Husserl’s own treatment of the question of psychologism as relativism is problematical because of placing much of the explanatory burden upon the notion of Evidenz. N o matter his arguments against individual or specific relativism,which the latter can be divided into epistemic and ontologic version,are without exception fall prey to the question-beggingly problem. In the subsequent part I turn to address on the contemporary dispute over self-stultifying charge of relativism and try to prove that this formal approach for rebuttal of relativism is very limited and ultimately cannot successfully overcomes it too.