建筑工业化进程中消费者行为策略研究——基于演化博弈视角

Research on Consumer Behavior Strategy in the Process of Building Industrialization——Based on Construction Game Theory

针对目前建筑工业化发展进程中需求市场发展依旧缓慢,消费者对工业化建筑需求较低的现状,利用演化博弈理论,构建不完全信息条件下政府与消费者之间的演化博弈模型,并通过雅可比矩阵分析得出演化稳定结果。研究结果表明:若消费者购买工业化建筑的最终收益低于其购买传统建筑所获得的最终收益,则消费者是否购买工业化建筑取决于政府的激励策略及力度大小;若消费者购买工业化建筑所得的最终收益高于其购买传统建筑所得收益时,则消费者选择工业化建筑,政府不激励是唯一演化稳定策略,并能达到社会效益的最大化。

In view of the current slow development of demand market in the development process of construction industrialization and the low demand of consumers for industrialized constructions,this paper uses evolutionary game theory to construct an evolutionary game model between government and consumers under incomplete information conditions.Comparable matrix analysis yields stable evolution results.The research results show that if the final income of consumers purchasing industrial buildings is lower than the final income obtained by purchasing traditional buildings,whether consumers purchase industrial buildings depends on the choice of government incentives and strength;if consumers buy industrial buildings,When the ultimate return is higher than the income from the purchase of traditional buildings,consumers choose industrialized buildings,and government incentives are the only evolutionary stability strategy and can maximize social benefits.