海绵城市建设PPP项目委托代理契约分析

Analysis on principal-agent contract for PPP project of sponge city construction

针对海绵城市PPP(Public-Private Partnership)项目建设、运营管理问题,为了降低由于项目参与的各方掌握信息、地位的不对称而产生的道德风险、维护各参与方的合法权益,基于一定的前提假设,构建海绵城市建设PPP项目契约模型,利用优化理论分别从代理企业和政府方两个主体的效用对模型的各个参数相关关系进行了分析,并利用数值模拟讨论了监控机制各参数对政府方监控意愿的影响。最后,结合常德市海绵城市PPP项目建设的案例,分别分析在当前考核机制下项目在建设、运营期可能存在的问题,并提出了相应的对策以解决这些问题。结果表明:代理企业的监控和激励措施具有互补性,海绵工程项目风险来源广泛,企业为规避风险会偏好零风险的固定收益,设定监控机制能激励企业更加努力的工作。

Aiming at the problems from the sponge city construction,operation and management of the PPP(Public-Private Partnership)project of sponge city,a model for the sponge city construction PPP project is established based on the a certain premise,so as to lower the moral risks caused by the asymmetries among the statuses of all the project participants and their obtained information for protecting the legal rights of all the participants,and then the correlation among all the parameters of the model are analyzed with optimization theory from the aspects of both the subjects of the agent enterprise and government,while the influences from all the parameters of the monitoring mechanism on the monitoring expectation from the part of government are discussed through the relevant numerical simulation.Finally,the problems possibly existed during the construction and operation of the project under the current appraisal mechanism are analyzed respectively in combination with the actual case of the construction of the sponge city PPP project of Changde City,while the corresponding countermeasures for solving these problems are proposed as well.The study result shows that as the sources of the risks from sponge city are extensive and the monitoring and incentive measures of the agent enterprise are complementary,the relevant enterprises are to prefer the fixed income without any risks,thus establishing the monitoring mechanism can incent the enterprises to make more efforts to do the work well.