摘要
物与事件的给出是2008年以来给出现象学的新进路。在第三次现象学还原之后的一系列工作中,马里翁初步将给出性规定为现象性的样式。将加西亚哲学作为外部碰撞或挑战,不仅有可能突破给出现象学对物的限制,而且能够合法地扩大饱和现象的边界:多一物,即多一种饱和现象。由此,给出概念实现了自身的激进化,即一切物都拥有“它给出”的全部可能性。“它给出”现象,并且这种现象化的实现依赖于物的事件性。承认而不是构造一个绝对“平”的物的丛林,既能避免陷入相关性循环,也拒绝成为一种新的所予神话。
The givenness of thing and event is the new approach of phenomenology of givenness since 2008. In a series of works after the third reduction of phenomenology,Marion preliminarily specified the givability as the mode of phenomenality. Taking Garcia’s philosophy as an external collision or challenge,it is not only possible to break through the restriction on thing of phenomenology of givenness,but also to legally enlarge the limit of saturated phenomena: one more thing,one more saturated phenomenon. From this,the concept of givenness achieved its own radicalization,that is to say,everything has the full possibility of "it gives". "It gives"Phenomenon and the realization of this phenomenolization depends on the eventness of thing. Recognizing rather than constructing an absolutely "flat"jungle is likely to avoid falling into the circulation of correlation and refuse to be a new myth of given.
作者
王蒙蒙
WANG Meng-meng(Department of Philosophy,School of Humanities,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310028,China)
出处
《河北学刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期212-216,共5页
Hebei Academic Journal
基金
2014年度国家社会科学基金重点项目《福柯与当代法国哲学的当代性之维研究》(14AZX013)
关键词
物
事件
给出
给出性
thing
event
givenness
givability