涉农小额贷款存续期内演化博弈稳定性

The Evolutionary Game Stability of Agriculture Petty Loans in Duration of Capital

在商业银行与农业生产者的涉农小额贷款博弈过程中,农业生产者存在擅自更改资金用途的可能,从而导致道德风险和逆向选择的出现。在这种情况下,商业银行发放涉农小额贷款不够积极,使得农业生产投入不足,严重制约了我国农业的发展。为了降低商业银行与农业生产者博弈过程中由于信息不对称带来的不利影响,文中结合博弈主体有限理性的实际情况,以商业银行和农业生产者的视角构建利益博弈模型,创新地利用演化博弈理论对涉农小额贷款存续期内稳定性展开研究,深入剖析农业生产者改变资金投向的动因,解构商业银行实现预期收益基础上控制涉农小额贷款风险的途径,为商业银行规避涉农小额贷款风险、提高涉农贷款监管能力提供决策建议。通过研究发现,筛选盈利能力高、信用风险低的项目进行贷款,对项目按照风险分类进行监管,提高农业生产者违约成本门槛4项因素对于防范涉农小额贷款风险至关重要,其对于降低由于信息不对称带来的道德风险和逆向选择具有积极意义。

In the process of the agriculture petty loan between commercial banks and agricultural producers,agricultural producers have the potential to arbitrarily change the use of funds,leading to the emergence of moral hazard and adverse selection.In this case,the commercial banks are not active enough in issuing petty loans to agriculture,which leads to insufficient investment in agricultural production and seriously restricts the development of agriculture in China.In order to reduce the adverse effects caused by information asymmetry between commercial banks and agricultural producers,this paper constructed a benefit game model from the perspective of commercial banks and agricultural producers,innovatively studied the stability of agricultural petty loans in duration of capital by using evolutionary game theory,and deeply analyzed the motivation of changing investment by agricultural producers considering bounded rationality.The motivation may be deconstructed the way to control the risk of agricultural petty loans based on the expected returns of commercial banks,and to provide decision-making suggestions for commercial banks to avoid the risk of agricultural petty loans and improve the supervision ability of agricultural petty loans.It is found that screening projects with high profitability and low credit risk for loans,supervising projects according to risk classification,and raising the threshold of default cost for agricultural producers are very important for preventing the risks of agricultural petty loans,which has positive significance for reducing the moral hazard and adverse selection caused by information asymmetry.