风险投资、企业会计信息透明度和代理成本

Venture Capital,Enterprise Accounting Information Transparency and Agency Cost

本文分析了风险投资对企业会计信息透明度和代理成本的影响机制和作用效果,以中小板和创业板上市企业为样本,分别对其IPO前和IPO后两个阶段进行分析。实证结果显示:风险投资能够对目标企业信息披露实现有效监督,提升其会计信息透明度;风险投资的参与对企业的治理和管理运营具有内生的监管效应,可以降低企业的信息不对称程度和代理成本。进一步研究还发现,不同特征的风险投资(机构)对会计信息透明度的影响存在差异性,联合风险投资和高声誉的风险投资机构能够发挥较好的监督和认证职能,而国有背景风险投资由于市场化运作滞缓,代理成本较高,监督职能发挥并不充分。该结论表明,风险企业在引入风险投资时,会更加青睐声誉高、社会关系网络广泛的风投,而针对国有背景风险投资参与的企业,外部投资者不应该盲目追逐,而应进行全面的调研分析和客观判断。

Take the small and medium-sized board and GEM listed companies as sample,the paper analyzes the mechanism and effect of venture capital’s influence on enterprise accounting information transparency and agency cost by comparing the listed companies before and after IPO. The empirical results show that venture capital has a positive influence on target enterprise’s corporate governance,which can reduce agent cost. This effect also can be realized by increasing the accounting information transparency of venture enterprise and the supervision and certification function of venture capital could highlight. Further research also shows that venture capital with different characteristics has different effect in the information disclosure,the joint venture capital and high reputation venture capital institutions’ influence on corporate governance and operation management are positive,but state-owned venture capital institutions do not play an effective role in supervising accounting information disclosure,the conclusion of state-owned venture capital institutions poses a challenge on the supervision and certification function of venture capital.