产能不对称情形下的竞争企业的共享合同选择

Selection of Shared Contract for Competitive Enterprises Under the Condition of Asymmetric Capacity

供求不平衡是市场上常见的问题,定价过高将导致需求减少,定价过低将引起库存不足,企业间的产能共享将很好地解决这一问题。考虑由制造商和零售商构成的两级供应链,研究了在不进行产能共享以及事前分享合同和事后分享合同两种情况下的竞争企业产能共享的最优策略,研究发现:企业利润在分享产能合同中未必大于产能不分享的情况,且在不同合同中企业利润的大小与双方企业价格竞争能力相关,反而与产能转移价格无关。同时指出市场不同类型消费者、政府补贴以及产品绿色度的大小对企业利润的影响变化。

Supply and demand imbalance is a common problem in the market,too high pricing will lead to the reduction of demand,too low pricing will lead to insufficient inventory,and the sharing of production capacity among enterprises will solve this problem very well.Considering the two-level supply chain composed of manufacturer and retailer,the optimal strategy of capacity sharing in competitive enterprises without capacity sharing,prior sharing contract and ex post sharing contract is studied.The study found that the profits of enterprises are not necessarily larger than the non-sharing of capacity in the contract of sharing capacity,and that the comparison of profits in different contracts is related to the price competitiveness of both parties.At the same time,it points out the influence of different types of consumers,government subsidies and green degree of products on the profits of enterprises.