中国地方政府隐性债务扩张中的机会主义效应——基于制度—心理互动的分析

Opportunistic Effect in Implicit Debt-borrowing of Local Governments in China——Analysis Based on Institutional-Psychological Interaction

尽管从形式上看,中国地方政府的隐性债务是游离于预算法之外的违法违规举债,但究其行为本质却是地方官员机会主义激励下的卸责举债,是制度-心理交互作用的结果。从制度维度审视,地方政府隐性债务的快速膨胀,是经济发展过程中地方政府"自上而下"激励过度与"自下而上"约束不足协同作用的结果,成为隐性举债难以忽略的制度因素。从心理逻辑来看,地方政府隐性债务扩张,是地方决策者在心理账户、损失厌恶、禀赋效应、安于现状偏差等情感因素影响下的认知偏差与行为"异象"。因此,治理地方政府隐性举债行为,不能仅仅停留于"制度主义"导向下的规则治理,更应兼顾地方官员的心理建设,实施"助推",引导地方官员做出理性的决策行为,从而实现由心而治。因此,制度-心理互动成为理解转型期地方政府行为选择新的分析视角,从而在方法论上突破了以往的"晋升锦标赛"和"财政压力"理论,对中国地方政府行为研究有新的启示。

Although in form, the implicit debt of local governments in China is a kind of illegal borrowing, which is free from the budget law, the essence of its behavior is the discharge of responsibility and borrowing motivated by opportunism of local officials, which is the result of the interaction of institution and psychology. From the perspective of institution, the rapid expansion of local government’s implicit debt is the result of the synergy between the excessive "top-down" incentive of local government and the insufficient "bottom-up" constraint in the process of economic development, which has become an institutional factor that cannot be ignored in implicit debt raising. From the viewpoint of psychological logic, the expansion of implicit debt is the cognitive bias and behavioral anomaly of local officials under the influence of emotional factors such as psychological accounts, loss aversion, endowment effect, and complacency with the current situation bias. As a result, to regulate the implicit debt-raising behavior of local governments, we should not only stay in the rule-based governance under the guidance of "institutionalism", but also take into account the psychological construction of local officials, implement "Nudge" to guide local officials to make rational decision-making behavior, so as to realize ruling by heart. Therefore, the Institution-Psychology interaction has become a new analytical perspective to understand local government behavior choices during the transition time, thus breaking through the previous "promotion tournament" and "financial pressure" theory in methodology, and providing new inspiration for the study of local government behaviors in China.