三权分置、农业补贴争夺与农业经营激励——吉林省J村玉米生产者补贴分配博弈

The Separation of Three Rights, Contest for Agricultural Subsidies and Incentive of Agricultural Management

基于产权理论,构建农业补贴分配利益主体的演化博弈模型,探讨产权主体的策略选择影响机理及其策略演化方向。研究结果表明,农地流转双方争夺农业补贴的实质是对土地剩余产权的界定;农地转出方凭借强势产权攫取本应归属农地实际经营者的农业补贴,不利于农业补贴的农业经营激励作用发挥,农地规模化经营出现倒退风险。因此,需尽快清晰界定土地承包权与土地经营权在土地剩余产权中的占有权能;创建农业补贴发放监管机构并实施农业补贴拨付和追踪问效机制;实施弹性的农业补贴政策以取代当前的挂钩补贴方式。

Based on the theory of property rights,this paper constructs the evolutionary game model of the interest subjects of agricultural subsidy distribution,discusses the influence mechanism of the strategic choice of the property right subjects and the direction of their strategic evolution.The results show that the essence of the scramble for agricultural subsidies is the process of defining residual property rights of agricultural land,the transferee of agricultural land grabs agricultural subsidies which should belong to the actual operator of agricultural land by strong property rights.It is detrimental to incentive role of agricultural subsidies and agricultural land moderate scale takes retrograde risks.Therefore,the occupying capacity of contract right and management right in the residual property rights of agricultural land should be defined clearly;a regulatory body for the distribution of subsidies and a mechanism for the allocation and tracking efficiencies of agricultural subsidies ought to be established and implemented;flexible agricultural subsidies must be implemented to replace the current linked subsidies.