基于双重委托-代理的科研团队成员知识创新激励机制研究

Knowledge Innovation Incentive Study on Scientific Research Team Members based on Double Principal-Agent Model

采用双重委托-代理关系模型研究科研团队成员知识创新激励机制,强化主体创新参与意识和知识贡献精神。在团队知识创新个体成员角色划分的基础上,论述团队知识创新中的双重委托-代理关系,进而分析双重关系中的知识创新激励机制,并提出基于人力资本价值差异的激励措施。团队层面的委托-代理关系表明,个体成员的拟线性效用令有效努力水平与其收益独立分配,符合科斯定理的"行动有效,与利益分配无关"的思想;个体层面的委托-代理关系分析表明,实施基于人力资本价值的差异化激励合约,其数值模拟和参数分析结果验证了知识贡献者的产出份额、努力程度以及确定性等价收入明显得到优化。

Double principal-agent relationship model is employed to study the incentive mechanism of scientific research team members′knowledge innovation,and to promote their knowledge innovation participation consciousness and knowledge contribution willingness.Based on the separation of individual member′s roles in the team′s knowledge innovation,the double principal-agent relationships in the team′s knowledge innovation is interpreted and the knowledge innovation incentive mechanism is analyzed in the double principal-agent relationship,and the incentive measures based on the various human capital values are presented.The analysis of the team′s principal-agent relationship indicates that a team member′s quasi-linear utility makes his/her effective effort independent from his/her profit,according with the idea of Coase Theorem that the action efficiency is indifferent from profit distribution.The analysis of individual principal-agent relationship indicates that when the differentiating incentive contract based on human capital value is implemented,the knowledge contributor′s output share,effort level and certainty equivalent are obviously more optimal which has been tested by numerical simulation and parameters analysis.