不确定风险下快递末端共同配送问题的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Logistics Terminal Integration by Joint Distribution under Uncertain Risk

快递末端服务作为快递服务的重要环节,在国家政策的大力支持和快递物流"最后一公里"新服务模式层出不穷的背景下,如何建立与快递物流末端共同配送服务定价机制、整合模式、收入共享模式等因素挂钩的最优扶持策略模型,对于有效实现快递业健康可持续发展有至关重要的作用。为了解决快递末端"最后一公里"问题的主要瓶颈,本文从定量角度分析表明:参加合作快递企业业务量在一定范围内,配送企业才有提升服务水平的动力,不然快递业务量不会因为共同配送而提高;如果共同配送项目是盈利的,那么随着联盟成员的增加,物流末端共同配送的总收益是增加的;当不确定合作博弈满足凸性,在合作方增加时,现有企业的分配也会随之增加;在一定风险厌恶系数约束下,企业可以根据可承受的风险程度甄选相应的收益分配,风险厌恶系数越大,各方分配越小。

The express terminal service is an important link of express service. In the context of the strong support of national policy and the endless flow of "last kilometer" new service mode of express logistics, how to establish the optimal support strategy plays a vital role in effectively realizing the healthy and sustainable development of express industry. The proposed model links to the pricing mechanism,integration mode and income sharing model of the end of the express logistics terminal. In order to understand the main bottleneck of the "last mile" problem at the end of delivery, this paper makes a quantitative analysis. The conclusion shows that if the business volume of the cooperative express enterprise is in a certain range, then the distribution enterprise has the power to improve the service level, otherwise the volume of express service will not be improved because of the common distribution. If the joint distribution project is profitable, then with the increase of the members of the alliance, the total revenue from the joint distribution at the end of the logistics is increased. When the uncertain cooperative games satisfy convexity and the partners increase,the distribution of existing enterprises will also increase. Under the constraint of a certain risk aversion coefficient, an enterprise can select the corresponding profit distribution according to the degree of risk that is acceptable. The greater the risk aversion coefficient, the smaller the distribution of the parties.