“目标—行为”适配视角的研发补贴申请博弈与政策优化

The Game Model and Policy Optimization in the Stage of R&D Subsidy Application from the Perspective of ’Intent-Behavior’ Fit

从政策预期目标与企业申请行为适配的视角,探讨研发补贴申请环节的政企博弈关系,寻求在研发补贴政策实施起点的企业申请行为端规避政策效应可能存在的偏差。构建研发补贴申请环节的政企博弈模型并进行均衡分析,求解实现市场完全成功的贝叶斯均衡情况下的约束条件,经过模型求解与数值仿真,发现"符合条件企业积极申请、不符条件企业不申请"这一"目标-行为"最优适配的均衡,受到研发补贴激励效应、企业造假成本、政府监督效率的影响。进而梳理研发补贴申请环节的政策优化设计"措施-导向-目标"效应传导关系,指出要实现研发补贴申请环节的政策效率优化目标,必须以"造假成本"提高、"监督效率"提升、"激励效应"增强为导向,并从政策指向明晰化、政策功能多元化、政策评审专业化、政策过程制度化等措施上提出了政策优化方向。

In order to avoid the deviation of policy efficacy that caused by the enterprises’ application behavior,the paper discusses the game model between government and enterprises in the stage of R&D subsidy application, from the perspective of the fit between policy intent and enterprises’ behavior. Firstly,the paper establishes the game model between government and enterprises and takes the equilibrium analysis to seek the constraints of the bias equilibrium with the completely successful market. Through calculating the model solution and taking data simulation analysis, this paper finds that the equilibrium of the optimal fit of the ’intent-behavior’that ’the qualified enterprises apply actively and the unqualified enterprises don’t apply’ is affected by the incentive utility of the R&D subsidies, the cheating cost of enterprises, and the supervision efficiency of government.Furthermore, the paper clarifies the transformation model of ’measures-orientation-target’ to optimize the policy in the stage of R&D subsidy application, and suggests that it must be oriented by increasing the ’cheating cost’,improving ’supervising efficiency’, and enhancing ’incentive utility’ to improve policy efficiency. Lastly, the paper puts forward the direction of policy optimization by proposing the measures including clarifying the policy objects, diversifying the policy functions, professionalizing the policy approval, and institutionalizing the policy process.