自有品牌零售商与制造商竞合策略演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Competitive and Cooperation Strategies Between Private Brand Retailers and Manufacturers

近年来,随着零售市场环境的突变,越来越多的零售商选择开发自有品牌以增加竞争优势,但这同时使得制造商的同质产品受到威胁,零售商与制造商均面临竞合策略的选择问题。在这种情况下,双方如何实现竞争与合作的对立统一,以达到双赢的局面是亟待解决的问题。建立零售商与制造商竞合策略演化博弈矩阵,分析其在不同情况下的演化稳定均衡策略发现:在一定条件下,演化稳定策略受到博弈双方策略选择初始比例、转移支付等因素的影响;双方是否达成合作演化策略由一方选择合作时,另一方选择合作相较于选择竞争所获得的净收益决定;提升联盟整体利益,公平分配收益有助于提高双方合作的长期稳定性。

In recent years,with the sudden changes in the retail market environment,more and more retailers have chosen to develop their own brands to increase their competitive advantage, but at the same time, the homogenous products of manufacturers are threatened,and retailers and manufacturers are faced with the choice of competitive strategy. In this case,how to achieve the unity of opposites of competition and cooperation,to achieve a win-win situation is an urgent problem to be solved. This paper establishes the evolutionary game matrix of both parties based on the competition strategy between retailers and manufacturers, and analyzes its evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy under different conditions, and empirically analyzes it. The research shows that under certain conditions, the evolutionary stability strategy is influenced by factors such as the initial ratio of strategy selection and transfer payment. Whether the two parties reach a cooperative evolution strategy decidedby when the manufacturer chooses cooperation, the net income that retailers choose to collaborate compared to competition and when the retailer chooses the cooperation, the net income that manufacturer choose to collaborate compared to competition;Benefits and fair distribution of benefits help to improve the long-term stability of cooperation between the two parties.