论中国强制要约收购制度之合理性 从法经济学视角分析

Is China’s Modification of the Mandatory Bid Rule Truly Inappropriate:A Legal and Economic Analysis

自上世纪九十年代英国强制要约收购制度被移植至中国后,中国对该制度进行了多次修订,极大地扩大了要约义务豁免的范围.修订后的强制要约收购制度争议颇多,许多声音认为该修订损害了小股东的经济利益,但实证证据的缺乏导致该争议至今未得出结论.本文从法经济学视角对该问题进行实证研究,分析了2011年至2014年所有要约义务豁免案例中目标公司绩效,发现修订后的强制要约收购制度能够显著促进目标上市公司绩效提升,小股东的经济利益未受到损害,因而中国对强制要约收购制度的修订具有合理性.该实证证据也对西方的静态模式—动态模式理论之争做出了一定贡献.

This study uses empirical evidence to give a relatively convincing answer to the heated debate as to whether China's modified Mandatory Bid Rule(MBR)really undermines minority shareholders,economic interests.After transplanting the MBR from the UK in the early 1990s,China amended this rule and grants exceptions on the basis of a much broader scope of grounds,and most acquirers who triggered the mandatory bid obligation could obtain the CSRC's dispensation.While there is a large body of literature discussing whether this modification undermines minority shareholders'economic benefits,however,none of them provides convincing empirical evidence,so the lack of empirical evidence makes either the advocators'or objectors'claims unpersuasive.This article seeks to address the current deficiency in research on empirical evidence.By using quantitative evidence,this study finds that China's modified MBR can significantly facilitate better performance by listed companies,so minority shareholders'economic benefits were not undermiged even though there were no material mandatory offers.This article also uses China's empirical evidence to contribute to the debatebet ween the static model theory and dynamic-model theory in the western world.