科研成果激励机制下民办高校与教师科研意愿博弈分析

Analysis of research intention between private universities and teachers under the reward mechanism of scientific research achievements

科研成果激励机制下,文章借助民办高校科研成本投入和教师所获成果奖励对科研意愿行为进行分析,运用混合策略纳什均衡找出博弈的均衡点。通过对均衡点的分析发现,教师科研意愿与民办高校所耗费的潜在成本无关。当原有科研成果奖励下的消极成本较小时,民办高校很难做出新的薪酬激励策略;当民办高校花费较小的投入就能获得较大的教师额外科研成果时,教师极易做出消极的决策;当新的成果奖励使教师收获较小期望值时,需要民办高校做出新一轮的激励机制。民办高校在奖励策略之外,通过一系列的政策要求提高教师消极成本,如科研考核、职称要求、退出机制等,可以降低采取消极策略教师的比例。

Under the incentive mechanism of scientific research achievements, this paper analyzes research intention with the help of the research cost input of private universities and the reward of teachers’ research achievements, the equilibrium point of game is found by using mixed strategy equilibrium. Through the analysis of the equilibrium point,it is found that teachers’ willingness to research has nothing to do with the potential cost of private colleges and universities. When the passive cost of the original research results is rewarded, it is very difficult for private universities to make new salary incentive strategies. When private universities spend less investment to get larger teachers’ extra research results, teachers are very likely to make negative decisions;when the new results encourage teachers to harvest smaller expectations, private colleges and universities need to make a new round of incentive mechanism. In addition to the reward strategy, through a series of policy requirements, such as scientific research assessment, title requirements,withdrawal mechanism, etc., the proportion of teachers who adopt negative strategies can be reduced.