装配式建筑外部效益分配问题研究——基于讨价还价博弈

A Study on the Distribution of Externality Benefits of Prefabricated Buildings——Based on Bargaining Game

基于外部性理论,提出装配式建筑产生的外部效益应该在各利益方之间均衡分配,实现外部效益向内部化转换,从而激发各利益主体推广装配式建筑的热情。在系统分析装配式建筑产生的外部效益的基础上,构建了政府、开发商和消费者三方之间的讨价还价博弈模型。现阶段只有满足开发商及消费者的最佳期望效益值,才能不断促使装配式建筑增量及转型。因此,为寻求最优的外部效益分配方案,构建了两种不同的博弈模型。一种是基于三大利益方的共同博弈模型,另一种是开发商与消费者达成短暂联盟与政府进行的讨价还价博弈。实证研究表明,开发商与消费者形成联盟方对分配结果有较大的影响。当开发商和消费者达成短暂联盟进行博弈时双方的分配额度都将增加,从而极大地增加了参与装配式建筑的积极性。

Based on the theory of externality,the externality benefits of prefabricated buildings should be distributed among the stakeholders in a balanced way.It is necessary to realize the transformation of externality benefits to internalization,and stimulate the enthusiasm of the stakeholders to promote the prefabricated buildings.A bargaining game model is built among the governments,real estate developers and consumers based on the systematic analysis of the externality benefits of prefabricated buildings.At present,the increment and transformation of prefabricated buildings can be continuously promoted by meeting the best expected benefit value of developers and consumers.Therefore,two different game models are constructed to seek for the optimal externality benefit distribution scheme.The common game model based on the three main interest subjects and the bargaining game among the developer,consumer and government are constructed.The empirical study shows that the alliance between developers and consumers has a great impact on the distribution results.The game will lead to an increase in the allocation for both sides when developers and consumers enter into a temporary alliance,which greatly increases the enthusiasm of stakeholders to participate in the prefabricated buildings.