PRESENT密码的差分故障攻击

The Differential Fault Attack of PRESENT Cipher

针对PRESENT密码算法的差分故障攻击,分析PRESENT算法差分故障传播特点的方式,优化导入故障位置,利用组合穷举搜索,建立不同的攻击模型来快速获取原始密钥.结果表明,影响PRESENT算法的差分故障攻击结果有两个因素:攻击轮数和故障密文数目.在倒数第二轮攻击平均需要30个故障密文就可以成功恢复出该轮64 bit轮密钥,在低轮数针对该密码算法进行差分故障攻击,仅仅需要9个故障密文就能恢复全部密钥.同时这种攻击方式在单故障密文的密钥搜索复杂度和攻击复杂度分别为226和231.

Aiming at the differential fault attack of PRESENT cipher algorithm, the differential fault propagation characteristics of PRESENT algorithm are analyzed and the import fault locations are optimized in this paper. On this base, different attack models for quickly obtaining the original cipher are established by using combination exhaustive search. The encryption process and attack process of PRESENT algorithm are implemented by using C++. The results reveal that there are two factors that affect the differential fault attack of PRESENT, the number of attack and the number of fault ciphertext. In the last second round attack, an average of 30 pieces of fault ciphertext are required to restore 64bit round key, while an average of only 9 pieces of fault ciphertexts are necessary to restore all keys in preceding rounds. Meanwhile, the attack complexity of this attack method of single fault cipher is 226, while the key search complexity is 231.