家庭地位与CEO薪酬——家庭中“序”的公司治理作用

Family Status and CEO Compensation——The Corporate Governance Role of Familial “Xu”

植根于中国特色的“差序格局”社会关系,本文以家族企业中家庭与董事会融合为切入点,从外生血缘关系的家庭地位测量家庭中的“序”,结合“差”探讨“序”对CEO薪酬的影响。实证发现:①CEO因处于不同家庭地位时薪酬出现分化,当CEO家庭地位较低时,薪酬更低;而CEO家庭地位较高时,薪酬更高;该结论在考虑了替代测量、测量误差以及CEO进入的内生性等稳健性检验之后仍然成立。这说明因CEO家庭地位的不同,存在差序格局中“序”的作用,并且家庭“序”与薪酬存在对称性。②这种对称性受CEO和亲属的家庭权力(是否年长)、社会权力(有无政治联系)和公司权力(是否兼任董事长、是否为控制人)影响,并且在CEO参与薪酬制定程度低或亲属参与程度高时更强。③进一步发现,低家庭地位CEO的薪酬随业绩变动的幅度更低,薪酬随超行业业绩表现提升的幅度也更小。同时还存在溢出效应,低家庭地位CEO公司中其他高管的薪酬也被降低;但高家庭地位CEO在薪酬随业绩变动和溢出效应上的作用均不明显。本文揭示了差序格局中家庭“序”在CEO薪酬中的治理作用,立体地拓展和补充了家族企业亲属涉入董事会的研究视角,对中国式公司治理尤其是家族企业治理理论和实践有参考价值。

CEOs'social relationship in the board has been the focus of corporate governance research,but most studies only focus on"Cha"(i.e.,difference)rather than"Xu"(i.e.,sequence).Using the family status determined by the external blood relationship to measure the familial"Xu",we empirically test the impact of CEOs'family status on their compensation.Our results show that:First,CEO compensation differs when they are in different family status.Compared with the non-relatives involved in the board,a CEO gets lower pay when his family status is lower than relatives in the board and gets higher pay when his family status is higher.Our findings are robust to alternative measures,measurement error,and the endogeneity checks.These results suggest that the"Xu"in the difference-sequence structure("Cha Xu Ge Ju")plays a governance role because of CEOs'different family status.Second,there is symmetry between family"Xu”and CEO compensation.This symmetry is influenced by family power,social power,and corporate power of CEO and the relatives.The symmetry is stronger when the participation of the focal CEO in the compensation decision process is lower or when that of their relatives is higher.Third,a CEO with lower family status exhibits weaker pay-performance sensitivity,which shows the non-contractuality of CEO compensation under the governance of familial"Xu" We further find a spillover effect that other executives'pay is also reduced when the CEO enjoys a lower family status.The compensation contract and spillover effect are absent in companies where the CEO has a higher status.This paper reveals that the familial"Xu"in the difference-sequence structure matters in corporate governance.Our findings expand and complement the research on family relatives'involvement in the board,and have important implications for the theory and practice of Chinese corporate governance,especially for family business governance.