实际控制人境外居留权、机构投资者与企业债务融资成本——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据

Actual Controllers’ Foreign Residency Rights, Institutional Investors and Corporate Debt Financing Cost: Based on the Evidences from China’s Private Listed Companies

以中国民营上市公司为样本,实证检验实际控制人拥有境外居留权对企业债务融资成本的影响。研究发现:实际控制人拥有境外居留权提高了企业债务融资成本,这种影响在非高新技术企业、更高控制权企业、实际控制人兼任董事长企业中更加明显。机制检验表明,实际控制人拥有境外居留权通过增加实际控制人掏空行为和企业违约风险两种途径来影响企业债务融资成本。此外,机构投资者持股能够缓解实际控制人拥有境外居留权对企业债务融资成本的正向效应。

Taking China’s private listed compani es as samples, this paper empirically examines the impact of actual controllers’ foreign residency rights on corporate debt financing costs. The findings show that if the actual controllers have foreign residency rights, the corporate debt financing costs will be increased, and this kind of effect is more significant in the non-high-tech enterprises, the enterprises with higher control powers, and the enterprises in which the actual controllers also hold the position as chairman of the board. The mechanism analysis shows that the actual controllers with foreign residency rights can affect corporate debt financing costs through the two paths of increasing the actual controllers’ tunneling behaviors and increasing the corporate default risks. In addition, the institutional investors’ holdings can relieve the positive effect of the actual controllers with foreign residency rights on the corporate debt financing costs. This paper can not only extend the researches on the economic consequences of actual controllers with foreign residency rights, but also provide useful policy reference to support the development of private economy.