基于三方动态博弈的上市公司舆情传播机理研究

Listed Company Based on Three-way Dynamic Game Research on the Mechanism of Public Opinion Communication

文章在对上市公司舆情传播过程中的信息利益相关者、网络媒体以及投资者进行描述分析的基础上,构建了三方动态博弈模型。通过参数设定、实验方案设计对所建模型进行了仿真模拟。实验仿真结果表明,信息利益相关者应当传递真实公司舆情,网络媒体不应与信息利益相关者合作传递虚假公司舆情,投资者不接受公司虚假舆情。最后,提出了证券监管部门治理上市公司舆情的对策措施。

The use of listed companies to carry out information-based manipulation of stocks is a new type of manipulation mode in China’s securities market in recent years. The listed company’s public opinion has unique characteristics different from social network public opinion in terms of communication media and participants.Therefore, studying the public opinion dissemination and evolution mechanism of listed companies can provide theoretical and technical support for securities regulatory authorities to effectively combat stock information manipulation and guide investors to identify false information. Based on the description and analysis of information stakeholders, online media and investors in the process of public opinion dissemination of listed companies, this paper constructs a three-party dynamic game model. The model was simulated by parameter setting and experimental scheme design. The experimental simulation results show that information stakeholders should convey the truth of the company, online media should not cooperate with information stakeholders to convey false company grievances, investors do not accept the company’s false grievances. Finally, the countermeasures for the securities regulatory authorities to control the public company’s public opinion are put forward.