制度环境对家族企业亲缘治理的弱化机制研究——基于CEO变更的经验证据

A Study on the Weakening Mechanism of Marketization on Family Business Kinship Governance——Empirical Evidence from the Perspective of CEO Turnover

亲缘治理是否有效一直是家族企业公司治理领域争论的焦点。文章以CEO变更作为切入点,以2008-2017年中国A股家族企业为样本,实证研究了公司业绩、亲缘关系以及CEO变更之间的关系。研究发现,公司业绩降低,CEO变更的可能性越高,但亲缘关系降低了家族企业CEO变更业绩敏感性。进一步研究发现,企业所处地区的市场化水平越高,亲缘关系的调节作用越弱。文章的研究表明“亲缘利他”会对公司治理产生一定的消极影响,而且利他水平会受到外部制度环境的影响。

Whether the kinship governance is effective has been the focus in corporate governance.This paper employed the data of family business during 2008-2017 from a CEO turnover perspective,which investigates the relationships among performance,kinship and CEO turnover.The paper found that the performance decline leads to the higher probability of CEO turnover,but kinship weakens the relationship between performance and CEO turnover.Further,compared to kinship mechanism in the regions where the level of marketization is higher,the mechanism of kinship in regions of lower marketization works better.These results demonstrate that kinship reduces the effectiveness of CEO turnover mechanism,which is affected by external marketization.