信用评级机构能对发债企业进行有效监督吗?——基于主体信用评级对股利政策影响的视角

Can Credit Rating Agencies Monitor Firms on Behalf of Bond Investors?——Evidence from the Influence of Credit Rating on Dividend Policy

文章以2010-2017年发行过债券并拥有信用评级的上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了主体信用评级对上市公司股利政策的影响。研究发现,信用评级接近下调的上市公司会显著减少现金股利的发放,更多的采用高送转股利分配方式;信用评级位于投资机和投机级交界处的上市公司降低现金分红的行为倾向更加明显。上述现象发生的机制是不同分红政策导致的评级调整差异会对上市公司未来的债务融资成本产生不同影响。文章还进一步排除了融资约束和经营状况变化等可能的竞争性解释。文章从信用评级对分红政策影响的角度证明了评级机构能够以信用评级为工具对发债企业进行有效监督,降低股东与债权人之间的代理成本,发挥公司治理作用。

This paper studies the relationship between credit rating and dividend policy,based on the data of Chinese listed companies which had issued bonds during the period of 2010 to 2017.We find that firms near a credit downgrade cut cash dividend payout ratio significantly and take advantage of stock splits more often as dividend.This action mode is more obvious around the boundary of invest grade and speculation grade.The mechanism is that different dividend policies can lead to different credit rating change directions which will affect the cost of future bonds.We also exclude the competitive explanations of financial constraints and operating changes.These results prove that credit rating agencies exercise their monitoring role well on behalf of bond investors and help to reduce the agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders.