国有企业法律规制与政治规制:从竞争到融合

Legal Regulation and Political Regulation of SOEs: From Competition to Convergence

正确处理"坚持党对国有企业的领导"和"建立现代企业制度"的关系是新时代国企治理的关键问题。这一问题在法学领域的映现就是国有企业法律规制和政治规制的关系问题。以《公司法》、《企业国有资产法》等一系列有关法律规范形成的法律规制和以党政方针、党内规定等政策文件形成的政治规制在国企内部形成二元规制模式。长期以来,法律规制与政治规制体系难以形成有效的理解和沟通,否认甚至排斥这种规制竞争,这对国企改革的理论和实践造成了极大的认识论障碍。在商事公司法制度供给与国有企业公共性特征下的制度需求形成错配的情况下,以加强党对国企领导的政治规制模式成为弥补法律规制不足的必要手段。然而,政治权力存在强制性、扩张性等特点,因此必须构造两种规制模式的耦合机制。党的领导进入公司章程以及《监察法》的制定反映了政治规制通过合法程序"嵌入"组织内部的行动,以实现两种规制模式的融合。

The relationship between "upholding the party’s leadership over SOEs" and "establishing a modern corporation system" is a key issue in the governance of SOEs in the new era. The reflection of this problem in the field of law is the relationship between political regulation and legal regulation of SOEs. The dual regulation mode is formed within SOEs by the legal regulation of the Company Law and the Law on State-owned Assets of Enterprises and the political regulations of the policy documents such as party policies and regulations. For a long time, it has been difficult for legal regulation and political regulation system to form effective understanding and communication, denying or even rejecting such regulatory competition relationship, which has caused great epistemological barriers to the theory and practice of SOEs reform. In the case of the mismatch between the institutional supply of commercial company law and the institutional demand of state-owned enterprises under the public characteristics, it is necessary to strengthen the political regulation mode of the party leading state-owned enterprises to make up for the deficiency of legal regulation. The incorporation of party leadership into the articles of incorporation and the formulation of the Supervision Law reflects the attempt of political regulation to embed itself into the organization through legal procedures, so as to realize the integration of the two regulatory modes.