政治竞争与财政分权决策：来自省直管县财政改革的证据

Political Competition and Fiscal Decentralization Policy:Case Study of Province Managing County Fiscal Reform in China

财政分权是许多国家推动经济发展与实现良好治理的重要政策。然而,学术界对中国财政分权决策过程研究较少,政府采纳财政分权政策的决定因素有待揭示。本文以省直管县财政改革为案例,基于中国干部管理体制建立政治竞争与财政分权政策决策的理论框架。运用全国地级市数据分析发现,省内地级市间的政治竞争显著降低了地级市推动省直管县财政改革的扩散程度,但对是否采纳改革影响不显著。县域政治竞争强度显著降低了地级市在辖区内启动改革的概率和扩散程度,这一负向影响随着地级市经济发展水平提升和时间趋势减弱。论文还讨论了上述发现的因果机制。

Fiscal Decentralization was a vital policy that many countries adopted to improved economy growth and good governance. However,scholars know little about China fiscal decentralization decision process,and the determinates and influence mechanisms of fiscal decentralization policy adoption and diffusion need to be revealed. Using case study of Province Managing County Reform in China,this article builds theory framework for explaining China local fiscal decentralization policy diffusion base on Chinese Nomenklatura system. According to national prefecture level jurisdictions data analysis,I find that the political competition at prefecture level decreases policy diffusion degree significantly,but have no effect on adoption hazard rate. Furthermore,the political competition at county level decreases policy adoption likelihood and diffusion degree significantly,which mediated by prefecture economy development and timing trend. Finally,the article discusses the mechanism of above findings.