基于投标方风险态度的建设项目投标报价博弈分析

Game Analysis of Bid in Construction Projects Based on Bidders’ Risk Attitude

最低价中标的招投标方法,是以完善的市场机制为前提的。但是目前我国建设市场中,招标投标方的机会主义行为突出。将投标方的风险态度纳入分析框架,构建建设项目招标投标中投标方之间的不完全信息静态博弈模型。结论表明投标方的贝叶斯均衡报价,不仅与自己对项目成本的估价和自己的风险态度相关,还与其他人的风险态度和外部的不确定性相关。

Winning the bid at the lowest price is based on a perfect market mechanism.However,in the current construction market,the opportunistic behavior of the bidding party is prominent.The bidders'risk attitude is integrated in the analysis framework;a static game model of incomplete information among all bidders in construction projects will be established.The conclusion indicates that bidder's Bayesian equilibrium bid is not only related to his own risk attitude and the valuation of cost,but also to others'risk attitude and the uncertainty.