参与者公平偏好对协作型众包创新绩效激励机制的影响

Research on the Impact of Participant’s Fairness Preference on Incentive Mechanism of Collaborative Crowdsourcing Innovation Performance

协作型众包创新是以最大化创新绩效为目标的众包模式,相关实践案例已有所显现,但协作型众包创新过程中参与方的努力行为经常受到其公平偏好心理的影响。针对这一问题,采用委托代理理论,通过设计仅基于个人创新绩效(AR)和基于总创新绩效(TR)的两种激励机制提升协作型众包创新绩效,并深入探讨公平偏好对激励机制的影响。结果表明,AR机制中参赛者不可能出现利他性努力行为,而TR机制下利己性努力和利他性努力均与公平偏好负相关;两种激励机制下众包创新绩效均随公平偏好敏感度增大而下降,参赛者数量增加是否有利于提升众包创新绩效也取决于公平偏好程度;TR机制一定会产生比AR机制更高的众包绩效及发包方经济收益,但这种价值效应会被参赛者的公平偏好心理所弱化。

Collaborative crowdsourcing innovation is a crowdsourcing model that aims to maximize innovation performance, and relevant practice cases have emerged nowadays. However, the efforts of the participants in the collaborative crowdsourcing innovation process are often influenced by their fairness preference. In response to this problem, the principal-agent theory is used to design two incentive mechanisms based on individual innovation performance(AR) and total innovation performance(TR) to improve the performance of collaborative crowdsourcing innovation, and to explore the value of fairness preference to incentive mechanism. The results show that participants in the AR mechanism are unlikely to have altruistic efforts, while self-interested efforts and altruistic efforts under the TR mechanism are negatively correlated with fairness preferences;under the two incentive mechanisms, the performance of crowdsourcing innovation decreases with the increase of the sensitivity of fairness preference, whether the increase in the number of participants is conducive to the improvement of crowdsourcing innovation performance depends on the degree of fairness preference;the TR mechanism will certainly produce higher crowdsourcing performance than the AR mechanism and the economic benefits of the crowdsourcer, but this value effect will be weakened by the participants’ fairness preference.