模糊不确定性下的多公司薪酬契约研究

Research on Managerial Compensation of a Multifirm Economy Under Ambiguity Uncertainties

通过对多公司情况下的标准委托代理契约的离散时间模型进行分析研究,并加入对产出分布的均值-方差联合模糊不确定性的考虑,在此基础上提出合适的薪酬契约形式,并运用到委托人和代理人的最优化问题中进行分析求解,观察双方的先验选择,得到最优契约的具体形式。研究结果表明,在此情况下委托代理双方对于模糊参数的选择能达成一致。而在无限经济中,最优契约包括对自身产出结果的分担和模糊不确定性的分担,不再受到其他公司的产出结果影响,并且合约对内部风险和系统风险的模糊补偿系数相同。

Given mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties of the probability distribution of the output,an analysis was made of a discrete time model of the standard principal-agent contract with a multi-firm economy.The proposed compensation contracting could make it possible that both parties chose the same worst prior with each other.It was concluded that in the infinite economy,the optimal contract was irrelevant to the output of other companies and it included two sharing rules,that is,sharing of the output and sharing of the ambiguity uncertainty.Besides,the agent’s and principal’s exposure to internal risk and systemic risk was the same.