信息不对称下供应链成员的决策顺序研究

Supply Chain Members’ Preferences over Decision Sequence with Information Asymmetry

市场需求通常是不确定的,而供应链成员之间关于需求信息会存在不对称性。本文采用"信号"博弈(Signaling)的方法,探讨信息不对称结构下供应链成员的最优决策顺序。考虑由两个成员组成的供应链,各成员需要决定自己的边际收益,后决策方可以观测到先决策方的决策,并推测(Infer)市场需求信息。研究表明:1)当信息精确度较低时,拥有信息的一方偏向于先决策,而当信息精确度较高时,其会偏向于后决策;2)无论信息精确度的高低,不拥有信息的一方总是偏向于先决策;3)对于整个供应链而言,当信息精确度较低时,拥有信息的一方先决策较优,而当信息精确度较高时,拥有信息的一方后决策较优。一些结论与直观相悖,取决于"信号"成本(Signaling cost)、先行者优势(First-mover advantage)以及后行者对先行者的反应之间的权衡。

Supply chain members usually have asymmetric demand information.In this paper,the supply chain members’ preferences over decision sequence with demand information asymmetry are studied in a signaling game.The supply chain consists of two members and each of them sets its profit margin to maximize its own profit.Three decision sequences are studied:the supply chain member with demand forecast information moves first in which case the second mover can infer the market demand information from the first mover’s decision;the member with less information moves first;and both members move simultaneously.It is shown that the member with demand forecast information will prefer to be the first mover if the information accuracy is low,but not if the information accuracy is high.However,the member without demand forecast information will always prefer to be the first mover.Further,the whole supply chain prefers the member with demand forecast information to be the first mover when the forecast is not very accurate,but not when the forecast is very accurate.Some results are counterintuitive,depending on the tradeoff between signaling cost,first-mover advantage,and the second mover’s strategic response.Our detailed analysis of the signaling game serves as a reference for researchers who are interested in the information asymmetry issues in supply chains.And our discussion about different decision sequences inspires researchers to consider operational problems with different supply chain power structures.