管理层业绩目标松弛、高管激励与企业风险承担水平

Performance Goal Slack, Executive Incentive and Enterprise Risk Taking Level

本文从企业风险承担视角出发,以2002~2016年的沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究了管理层业绩目标制定过程中的收入目标松弛行为对企业风险承担水平的影响。研究发现:收入目标松弛能够提升企业的风险承担水平,驱使管理层基于股东利益行事,说明了业绩目标契约能够起到治理作用,这种关系在民企表现更为明显;同时还发现高管货币薪酬激励和在职消费激励均弱化了收入目标松弛的企业风险承担效应,而货币薪酬激励的抑制作用在民企表现得更明显,在职消费的负向调节作用在国企表现更为明显。本文的研究为企业如何处理目标设置过程中的松弛问题提供了新的思路。

From the perspective of enterprise risk-taking,this paper studies the influence of the income target slack behavior in the process of formulating management performance goals on the level of enterprise risk taking by taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2002 to 2016 as samples.The study finds that the income target slack can improve the risk taking level of enterprises,and drive management to act based on the interests of shareholders,which indicates that the performance target contract can play a governance role,and this relationship is more obvious in private enterprises.At the same time it is also found that both the executive monetary compensation incentives and the non-pecuniary compensation incentives weaken the risk taking effect of the income target slack.However,monetary compensation incentive has a more obvious inhibiting effect on private enterprises,the negative moderating effect of employment consumption is more obvious in state-owned enterprises.This study provides a new idea for enterprises to deal with the slack problem in the process of goal setting.