激进怀疑主义问题的完全解决?——对普理查德“双视融合方案”的考察

Complete Resolution to the Radical Skeptical Problem:An Investigation to Pritchard’s Biscopic Proposal

当代反激进怀疑主义方案主要在面对知识封闭性原则时遇到困难,邓肯·普理查德认为激进怀疑主义问题产生于两个相互独立的哲学论题,即理性评价的普遍性论题和理性的偏狭性论题。对此,普理查德提出了针对知识封闭原则为基础的激进怀疑论证的维特根斯坦式方案,和针对不完全决定原则为基础的激进怀疑论证的知识论析取主义方案。两个方案既相容又相互支持,构成所谓"双视融合方案"的减弱型反激进怀疑主义策略。在考察了学界相关批评与回应之后,笔者认为该策略并未完全解决激进怀疑主义问题,关键在于维氏方案对理性评价的普遍性论题的拒绝是不完全的。一种可能的进路是,在逻辑上重新阐述理性的局限性,从而构成对两种方案及其融合的有效补充。

The contemporary anti-radical skepticism mainly encounters difficulties in the face of the closure principle of knowledge. Duncan Pritchard believes that radical skeptical problem arises from two independent philosophical theses, namely the universality of rational evaluation thesis and the insularity of reasons thesis, which thus requires two different proposals: the Wittgensteinian proposal responding to the closure-based radical skeptical paradox, and the epistemological disjunctivist proposal to the underdetermination-based radical skeptical paradox. The two proposals are compatible and mutually supportive, constituting the so-called "biscopic proposal", an undercutting anti-radical skeptics strategy. After examining the related criticism and responses, we believe that this strategy does not completely solve the problem of radical skepticism, since the refute against the universality of rational evaluation in Wittgensteinian proposal is incomplete. One possible approach is to logically reinterpret the locality of rationality, thus providing an effective complement to both proposals and their integration.