摘要
文章基于产品单向替代和碳税政策,考虑由单个制造商和两个零售商组成的供应链,制造商生产两种碳足迹不同的替代产品,建立了以制造商为主导的Stackelberg单周期博弈模型,分析了集中决策和分散决策下两种产品的最优零售价和制造商碳减排水平.研究表明,碳税设置在合理范围内时才能起到促进企业节能减排的作用.通过数值分析发现集中决策下减排量最大并能有效提高供应链利润;消费者价格敏感系数和低碳偏好的增大会使两种产品的价格增大,减排量也随之增大.
Based on carbon tax and one-way substitution of products, considering the pricing of a supply chain with one manufacture and two retailers, which manufacture produces two alternative carbon footprint products, this paper established a stackelberg single-period game to decide the optimal wholesale prices and sale prices, in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. Supply chain reduction and pricing are analyzed under the conditions of integrated manner and decentralized manner. The results indicated that the carbon tax rate should be set within a reasonable range in order to reduce carbon emissions. The numerical analysis proved the integrated manner can effectively improve the profit of supply chain and had the maximum carbon emission reduction. We also find the increase price sensitive coefficient will lead the increase the price of the two products and the reduce carbon emissions, as well as the consumer low carbon preference.
作者
刘芯彤
罗治洪
LIU Xintong;LUO Zhihong(School of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650093,China)
出处
《物流科技》
2019年第12期4-8,共5页
Logistics Sci-Tech
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目“面向柔性需求的金属供应链计划建模及列生成算法研究”(71562024)
昆明理工大学人才培养基金资助项目“基于多阶段差别模式的金属供应链计划建模及列生成算法研究”(KKSY201508010)