摘要
研发投入在一定程度上决定着企业的创新能力。既有关于企业研发投入影响因素的研究中,缺少将高管股权激励和货币薪酬激励相结合的研究,以及对国有企业和民营企业的比较研究。本文基于代理成本的视角,以2007年—2017年沪深A股2188家上市公司的面板数据为研究样本,采用固定效应回归模型分析了高管薪酬激励机制对研发投入水平的影响。结果显示,高管短期货币薪酬激励与研发投入水平不相关,高管股权激励、激励机制与研发投入正相关,且民营企业优于国有企业。这也印证了对国有企业进行混合所有制改革和高管薪酬激励机制改革的必要性。
Research and development(R&D)investment determines the innovation ability of enterprises to a certain extent.In the studies on the influencing factors of enterprise R&D investment,there is a lack of studies on the combination of executive equity incentive and monetary compensation incentive,as well as the comparative studies on state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.This paper analyzes relationship between the incentive mechanism and the R&D investment using the fixed effects regression from the perspective of agency cost to 2007-2017 A shares 2188 panel data in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.The study concluded that the short-term monetary incentive for R&D investment level was not related,but executive stock ownership and incentive mechanism had a positive effect,and private investment level was better than state-owned enterprises.Finally,the paper puts forward suggestions on the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises and the reform of executive income.
作者
韩贺洋
陈彩云
HAN Heyang;CHEN Caiyun(Shihezi University,Shihezi 832000,China;Fuyang Normal University,Fuyang 236037,China;Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)
出处
《新疆财经大学学报》
2019年第4期50-59,共10页
Journal of Xinjiang University of Finance & Economics
基金
安徽省高校人文社会科学研究重点项目“控制权、高管薪酬激励与资本结构调整”(SK2018A0289)
关键词
激励机制
研发投入
混合所有制经济
高管
股权激励
货币激励
incentive mechanism
research and development(R&D)investment
mixed ownership economy
management
stock options
monetary incentive