交易所预防性违规监管与上市公司信息披露质量的改善——基于深交所监管函的证据

Preventive Regulation on Non-compliance of Exchanges and Improvement of Information Disclosure Quality of Listed Companies——Based on Evidence from Shenzhen Stock Exchange Regulatory Letters

证券交易所一线监管的有效性日益引发社会及研究者的关注。以深交所出具的监管函为研究对象,实证考查了我国交易所预防性违规监管对上市公司信息披露质量的影响。结果表明:深交所采取的监管函措施能够促进上市公司信息披露质量的改善;交易所监管关注对审计行为有风险溢出效应;在控制了样本偏差可能产生的内生性后,发现收到监管函的上市公司更可能被审计师出具非标准审计意见。

The effectiveness of front-line regulation of stock exchanges has increasingly attracted the attention of the society and researchers.Based on the supervisory letters issued by Shenzhen Stock Exchange,this paper empirically examines the impacts of preventive regulation on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.The results show that the regulatory letters can improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,the regulatory concern of exchanges has risk spillover effect on auditing behavior,and after controlling the endogeneity that may result from sample bias,it is found that listed companies that receive regulatory letters are more likely to be issued non-standard auditing opinions by auditors.