管理层持股、双重代理成本与企业投资效率

Management Shareholding, Dual Agency Cost and Investment Efficiency of Enterprise

以2013-2017年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,从现代公司治理理论和双重代理理论角度出发,构建面板数据模型,探究管理层持股和双重代理成本对企业投资效率的影响及其是否具有中介效应。研究表明:管理层持股与投资效率显著正相关;管理层持股能够有效地降低第一类代理成本,但对第二类代理成本的作用效果不显著;第一类代理成本对企业投资效率具有显著的抑制作用,第二类代理成本对企业投资效率具有显著的促进作用;第一类代理成本在管理层持股对企业投资效率的影响中存在部分中介效应,但第二类代理成本的中介效应不显著。

Taking the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2017 as samples, from the perspective of modern corporate governance theory and dual agency theory, the panel data model is constructed to explore the impact of management shareholding and dual agency costs on corporate investment efficiency as well as whether they play a mediating role in it. The research shows: the management shareholding is significantly positively correlated with investment efficiency which can effectively reduce the first type of agency cost, but the effect on the second type is not significant;the first type of agency cost has a significant inhibitory effect on the investment efficiency of the enterprise while the second type has a significant promotion effect;the first type of agency cost has some mediating effect on the influence of management shareholding on corporate investment efficiency, but the second type is not significant.