公司重整中经营控制权人更换机制之构建

The Construction of The Mechanism of Replacing the Managerial Controller in Corporate Reorganization

公司重整中的经营控制权人更换机制是公司重整中"两权分离"问题的有效应对,也是利害关系人在重整谈判中的重要筹码。然而,更换经营控制权人必须经法院批准,且符合公司重整的制度目标。美国公司重整中的经营控制权人更换机制包括法院应利害关系人的请求,依据《美国破产法典》第1104条任命管理人取代债务人董事会及管理层,以及股东经法院批准召开股东会选举董事。我国应当借鉴美国法上的相关规则,完善《企业破产法》中的管理人更换机制,构建终止债务人自行管理机制。我国法院在审查股东提出的召开股东会选举董事的请求时,除了借鉴美国判例法上的规则,还应考虑到我国重整制度为债权人提供的保护机制存在不足,从而采用由股东承担举证责任的裁判规则。

The mechanism of replacing the managerial controller in corporate reorganization is an effective response to the problem of the separation of two kinds of rights in corporate reorganization,and an important bargaining leverage of parties in interest in reorganization bargaining.However,the replacement of the managerial controller should be approved by the court,and be consistent with the purpose of corporate reorganization.The mechanism of replacing managerial controller in US corporate reorganization includes the court’s replacing the debtor"s board of directors and management with a trustee according to the Section 1104 of the US Bankruptcy Code as a response to a party of interest’s request,and shareholder meetings which are convened to elect directors and approved by the court.China should use the relevant rules of US law as an example,improve the mechanism of replacing the trustee in Enterprise Bankruptcy Law,and construct the mechanism of terminating debtorin-possession management.When the Chinese courts examine the request of convening shareholder meetings raised by shareholders,apart from using the rules in US case law,the deficiencies of the protection mechanism that Chinese reorganization system provides for creditors shall be considered,and the judicial rule of imposing burden of proof on shareholders shall be adopted.