考虑政府激励政策的绿色供应链博弈模型及契约协调研究

Green Supply Chain Game Models and Contract Coordination with Government Incentives

研究政府的激励政策对于制造商研发设计绿色产品以及供应链协调机制的影响。通过构建集中决策下的垂直博弈模型、分散决策下制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型,分别得到均衡的绿色度、定价策略以及各组织利润。在此基础上提出了基于收益共享或成本共担契约的供应链协调机制,得到最优的成本共担与收益共享比例。利用数值分析对上述结论进行验证,并进行了参数敏感度分析。研究表明,相比于分散决策,集中决策下的绿色度更大、零售价更低、供应链整体利润更大。单一的成本共担契约无法实现供应链协调;对于综合契约协调机制,收益共享比例与成本共担比例负相关。各组织利润与绿色产品单位补贴调节因子以及绿色度敏感度系数正相关、与价格敏感度系数以及绿色投资系数负相关。

For the green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer while consumers are sensitive to the price and greenness of green products,an investigation is conducted into how the government's incentive policy affects the manufacturer's decision-making about green products'greenness and supply chain coordination mechanism.A vertical game model under centralized decision-making and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model under decentralized decisionmaking is established to get the optimal price,greenness and profits of every organization.Then,cost-sharing or revenue sharing contracts are proposed to coordinate the supply chain.The above conclusions are verified through a numerical analysis and the parameters sensitivity analysis is carried out.The study indicates that:compared with decentralized decision-making,under centralized decision,the greater the green degree is,the lower the retail price is and the higher the overall profits of the supply chain are;and a single cost-sharing contract cannot achieve supply chain coordination;and for the revenue sharing contracts combined with cost sharing,the ratio of revenue sharing is negatively related to the ratio of cost sharing;the profits of each member are positively correlated with the adjustment factors of government subsidies and the coefficient of greenness sensitivity but negatively correlated with coefficients of the price sensitivity and the green investment.