组织同构与治理嵌入:党建何以促进私营企业发展——以D市J科技园企业党建为例

Institutional Isomorphism and Governance Embeddedness: How Does Party Building Improve the Performance of Private Corporations?

当前私营企业党建已经实现全覆盖,然而对党建如何影响企业发展的机制分析仍不充分。文章在区分党建的不同发展阶段后,从社会学新制度主义和企业治理的角度切入就党建对私营企业外部竞争与内部治理的影响进行分析。研究发现,党建可被视为企业在趋同压力下获取合法性以提高外部竞争优势的过程。其次,基于效益最大化,企业存在将党建嵌入到治理之中的需求。第三,党组织参与企业治理的核心在于发挥党员人力资本优势。除此之外,将企业党建转换为内部治理优势仍然需要一定的前提条件。随着制度趋同压力的增强,党建带来的外部竞争优势的效用可能会降低。

Party building has achieved full coverage in private enterprises since 2015, but research on how it affects their development is still insufficient. This paper defines the different stages of Party building first and then it analyzes its influence over the external market competition and internal governance of private enterprises from the perspective of institutionalism and corporate governance. Party building can be seen as a process in which companies gain legitimacy under the pressure of convergence and increase their external competitive advantages. To maximize their profit, enterprises want to include Party building in their governance. In addition, including Party branches in internal governance aims at utilizing Party members’ human capital. However, the transformation of Party building into governance advantages still requires certain preconditions, with the increase of external convergence pressure, the effectiveness of external competitive advantages may be reduced.